stated that it was very unlikely 'that the Brown-Bush relationship is going to go through the baptism of fire and therefore be joined together at the hip like the Blair-Bush relationship' (Malloch Brown 2007) . Appointees such as international development minister Douglas Alexander openly criticised Washington's unilateralism. Even Foreign Secretary David Miliband, in consistently describing the US as 'our single most important bilateral relationship', seemed almost wilfully to be avoiding the loaded term, 'special relationship' (Miliband 2007) .
Beyond rhetoric and symbolism, real acrimony between London and Washington was observable not only in relation to possible troop withdrawals from Iraq, but also concerning tactical disagreements in the Afghanistan campaign. London reportedly clashed with Washington over the extent of the latter's support for the regime in Kabul, over the US poppy eradication programme (seen by the British as alienating Afghan 'hearts and minds'), and over the US unwillingness to negotiate directly with Iran (Maddox 2007) . Redefinition of the Special Relationship after Blair did appear a possibility.
Journalist Andrew Rawnsley called for a 'declaration of independence from America' (Rawnsley 2007) . Ian Kearns urged Brown to 'assert politically that it is possible to be serious minded on security without agreeing with everything an American administration does' (Kearns 2007 ; see also Gamble and Kearns 2007) . Victor Bulmer-Thomas argued that 'there will no longer be unconditional support for US initiatives in foreign policy', whoever was in power in Washington. Brown's change in rhetorical tone involved no attempt to alter the defence and intelligence structures of the Special Relationship. This is not to suggest that there was no shift at all. In a sense, Brown's JFK Library speech was a response to the post-Blair calls for a re-definition: to Rawnsley's appeal, for example, for Brown to recognise that 'the big issues of this century', including climate change, 'cannot be addressed by a foreign policy obsessed only with hugging Washington' (Rawnsley 2007) . By the time of Brown's second, April 2008 , official visit to the US, of course, even the symbolism had changed. Memories of the Iraq invasion and its associated sense of national humiliation had faded to some degree. The European political landscape also had shifted with the more pro-American noises emanating from Paris and Berlin. A Times leader noted that the symbolic distancing 'might have won temporary plaudits in the Labour Party', but it had made Brown 'a much more marginal figure in Washington' (The Times 2007). In the event, Brown publicly acknowledged 'a great deal of gratitude' to Bush for his policies on terrorism, while enthusiastically using Special Relationship language, including invocation of the need to stand 'shoulder to shoulder' with the US (Watt and MacAskill 2008) .
During his April 2008 trip, Brown, even in the JFK Library address, had precious little to say about liberal interventionism. The emphasis was on the democratising power of new technologies, on mobilising 'the power of ideas, of shared values and of hopes that can win over hearts and minds', rather than military intervention. Given the international reaction to the invasion of Iraq, such an emphasis was inevitable. It should also be borne in mind that Blair's parallel speech, the 1999 Chicago address, had been concerned to spell out the limits to liberal interventionism in the Balkans context (Freedman 2007, 624) . Liberal interventionists were nevertheless alarmed, with Jonathan Powell (Blair's former chief of staff) arguing that 'liberal interventionism will survive as the best way of defending our interests and the moral way to promote our values'. For Powell, the real mistake over Iraq was the failure to make sufficiently explicit its humanitarian motives and purpose (Powell 2007 ; see also Plant 2008) .
The desire to disassociate from the Blair legacy was not confined to the Labour Party. Blair had been able to rely on Conservative Party support for his Iraq policy. However, in September 2005, on the fourth anniversary of 9/11, Conservative Party leader David Cameron criticised 'unrealistic' and 'simplistic' world views emanating from Washington. He contrasted his own 'liberal conservatism' with the harsher beliefs of 'neoconservatives'. Cameron's remarks earned him a rebuke from Margaret Thatcher (Coates 2006) . In fact, both Cameron and shadow foreign secretary William
Hague seem to embrace a species of hybrid 'neo'/'liberal' conservatism, defined in terms of a foreign policy philosophy which supports liberal, freedom-promoting interventionism with (to quote Cameron) 'humility and patience' (Dodds and Elden 2008, 349, 357 As the second largest military contributor to the engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, Britain stood somewhat apart from its European allies. According to 2007 estimates, the UK was the second biggest military spender in NATO, with annual defence spending at $63.3 billion; the American figure was $545.3 billion (Briefing 2008) . Contemporary British defence policy is predicated on the assumption that large, high-intensity operations will involve the US-UK alliance (Edmunds and Forster 2007, 41) . The 2003 Defence White Paper reported a strategic environment where 'the most demanding expeditionary operations, involving intervention against state adversaries, can only plausibly be conducted if US forces are engaged, either leading a coalition or in NATO' (Dorman 2008, 22) . British defence policy is rooted in a formal commitment to NATO and, indeed, to the European Union, but increasingly appears to be oriented to the English-speaking ABCA (Australia, Britain, Canada, the US and New Zealand) community (Dorman 2008, 51) . (Archik 2005, 11) . A widely held impression of Brown's likely policy direction was (to quote Mark Leonard) 'that his brand of "British exceptionalism" could lead to a foreign policy that is both less Atlanticist and less pro-European' than that followed by Blair (Leonard 2007 ). An International Affairs article in 2007 saw Brown as likely to adopt an 'awkward partner' or 'pragmatic player' role (rather than a 'heart of Europe') role Washington was prepared to stand back as European powers negotiated with Iran. According to Constanze Stelzenmuller, the new American reorientation involved 'a number of things the world was once emphatically told no US administration would ever do again' (Stelzenmuller 2008, 9) .
Even in the first term, the administration came nowhere near the abandonment of multilateralism.
Tensions within NATO, of course, were very evident, not least in the conflict which emerged as the test of the alliance: the engagement in Afghanistan. US Defence Secretary Robert Gates complained, as he looked to the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, that the organisation could become a two-tier alliance with 'some allies willing to fight and die to protect people's security, and others who are not' (Briefing 2008 George H. W. Bush, the prospect of a reunited Germany replacing the UK as Washington's main national transatlantic interlocutor emerged, and was regarded by London as a threat to the US-UK Special Relationship and its putative pay-offs of favours and influence (Treverton 1990, 708; Coker 1992 McCain, and a Democratic victory in November was expected to spill over into more favourable public opinion ratings for the US generally. Nevertheless, to risk stating the obvious: Brown's Boston rhetoric did not reflect the tenor of British public opinion during the Bush presidency. US commentator Fareed Zakaria drew the following conclusion: 'while one might laud Tony Blair for his loyalty, one cannot expect democratic politicians to ignore the wishes of vast majorities of their people' (Zakaria 2008, 249) .
As for values more generally, Britain and America may be joined by a general commitment to the ways of democratic capitalism. During the 1980s in particular, an Anglo-American, neo-liberal capitalist model, associated with the increased marketisation of the political arena in both countries, emerged (see Krieger 1986 ). However, if we look at public 'values' in a wider sense, what is striking is the very persistence in Britain of collectivist impulses in areas such as welfare and health provision, despite the dominance of neo-liberal political discourse since the 1980s (Dumbrell 2006, 40-45) . To take data simply from polls published in 2008, almost twice as many Britons as Americans appear to believe that that their government should reduce taxes for the poor. Twice as many Americans as British 'strongly agree' that the 'profit motive is the best spur to job creation'. Perhaps more surprisingly, Britons are keener on free trade than are Americans. US public opinion is far more polarised than its British equivalent on issues such as homosexuality, action against Iran and economic globalisation (Britain and America 2008) William Odom, US National Security Agency Director between 1985 and 1989) remarked that 'the name of the British game is to show up with one card and expect to call the shots' (Urban 1996, 28) .
The Special Relationship has been a very bumpy ride. However, at least arguably, some sense of balance and sustained mutual trust has been preserved over the years. some British businesspeople involved in Cuban trade were actually denied entry to the US (Black 1996) . In fact the extraterritorial elements of the Helms-Burton legislation were virtually negated by Clinton's waiving of the relevant provisions, a practice which continued under President Bush (Haney and Vanderbrush 2005, 112-19) . Extraterritoriality, however, was also a feature of the post-9/11
Patriot Act. Designed to interrupt sources of funding for terrorism, the Act imposed US jurisdiction, and extensive reporting requirements, on non-US banks. Anti-terrorist port security laws imposed As indicated above, the common sense of Special Relationship imbalance derives to some extent from the bifurcated nature of American federal government, and indeed to some extent from the nature of US federalism itself. The White House itself is frequently embarrassed by congressional activity which seems to run counter to the thrust of executive branch-led foreign policy. British diplomacy has often failed sufficiently to take account of the fragmented nature of the US foreign policy process, not just in executive-legislative terms, but also in terms of intra-executive divisions and counter-currents. One of the Blair government's problems was its tendency to value contacts with the State Department at the very time that it was being shut out of other important loops, notably those involving Vice President Richard Cheney. Access to elements within Washington's complex and byzantine decisional structures is often confused with influence over final policy (Heuser 1996 ). Yet it is also the case that the White House is sometimes able to exploit the fissiparious nature of the American system for its own purposes, blaming Congress for behaviour that it finds difficult to defend to its allies overseas.
An interesting case here is that of defence technology sharing. From London's perspective, not only the US Congress but also the White House itself became excessively cautious after 9/11 in sharing defence technology, even with the country which was coming most obviously to America's aid in Iraq. The US has been concerned with the possible re-export from the UK of military technology to China (Archik 2005, 20 but was also willing to make public his disagreements with elements of British policy (notably regarding poppy eradication) in Afghanistan (Beeston and Baldwin 2008) . On the Democratic side, a minor storm blew up over Hillary Clinton's claims that she played an important role in the 1990s
Northern Irish peace process (Baldwin 2007 ). Obama's choice of Germany to make his key European
